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Volume 02, Issue 02 (August 2012)
Yeti Nisha Madhoo and Shyam Nath
https://doi.org/10.1142/S2010269012500068
Abstract
The objective of the paper is to empirically examine the effects of macroeconomic volatility on growth and other indicators of welfare incorporating more particularly geography produced diverse conditions that are either growth promoting or growth hampering. We extend the literature on macroeconomic volatility, growth and welfare by integrating the macroeconomics and new development economics literature on cross-country growth performance by capturing factors beyond neoclassical and new growth approaches. Empirical results confirm that growth outcomes under different geography-produced favorable and adverse conditions have the potential of minimizing and exacerbating the effects of macroeconomic variability. The significance of geography and its links with institutions is highlighted and adverse growth and welfare effects of income inequality, coastal openness and trade openness are analyzed.
See: https://www.worldscientific.com/toc/ijdc/02/02
2. India And China: Development Policies, Challenges, and Strategies
Romi Jain
https://doi.org/10.1142/S201026901250007X
Abstract
As the world’s fastest growing economies, India and China have significantly served as “engines of world economic growth”. At the same time, they are beset with gigantic internal socio-economic problems and are endeavoring hard to achieve economic growth with social justice for a greater “societal good”. Given their ideologically divergent political systems and varying historical and cultural experiences, however, India and China have pursued radically different development paths to achieve their respective socio–economic goals. This article addresses the dynamics of development within theoretical perspectives, deals with development policies, perspectives and strategies of India and China in the historical backdrop, and spells out their development challenges which need to be addressed to achieve social justice and inclusive growth.
See: https://www.worldscientific.com/toc/ijdc/02/02
3. Oil, Conflict, and Sustainable Development in Africa
Okolo Ben Simon
https://doi.org/10.1142/S2010269012500081
Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that Africa is one of the richest continents in terms of its abundance of natural resources. However, it still remains impoverished amidst its riches. Oil, which is a major driver in world development, is one of the natural resources abundant in about 21 African countries. Incidentally, oil has continued to “under-develop” Africa. In fact, it has often been suggested by scholars that oil has been a source of, and a fuel for some of the conflicts that litter the political history of Africa. With the continued world demand for oil and its further discovery in more African countries, this paper argues that African countries should deploy the vast revenue from its oil resources for the development of the continent within the confines of the sustainable development paradigm. The paper seeks to suggest ways for Africa’s management of its resources in a more sustainable manner.
See: https://www.worldscientific.com/toc/ijdc/02/02
Jose Cuesta and Syed Mansoob Murshed
https://doi.org/10.1142/S2010269012500093
Abstract
This paper expands the micro-foundations of the traditional greed and grievance non-cooperative model of civil conflict. First, we allow for greed and grievance to be orthogonal, so that they may affect each other rather than being exogenous. Second, we allow for the reaction curves of both parties in non-cooperative games to be substitutes and not inevitably complementary, so a peaceful strategy from a group may be followed by a belligerent upsurge from the other. Third, we also allow for Diaspora transfers to rebel groups, thus generating a trade-off between the gains associated with peace and war among rebels. Fourth, we expand external aid in the form of fungible financing of government transfers ‘buying’ peace by allowing for mechanisms that induce behavioural change towards peace. These extensions provide a better understanding of conflict persistence, the consequences of competing international aid and sub-optimal sanctions provision (“cheap talk”) by the international community.
See: https://www.worldscientific.com/toc/ijdc/02/02
5. Civil Conflict & its Quasi Criminal Status: Some New Insights
Partha Gangopadhyay
https://doi.org/10.1142/S201026901250010X
Abstract
This paper develops a game-theoretic framework to examine civil conflict arising from predation. From activities of predation, or appropriation, and protection we highlight the optimal choices of a benevolent dictator, or government, at the core and a self-seeking rebel group at the periphery in terms of their arms spending, or scales of militancy, when the dictator has already pre-committed the transfers, or gifts, to the periphery. In the Cournot–Nash equilibrium of the proposed game, we make three important contributions to the literature: First, we explain some of the causes of civil conflict hitherto unknown in the literature. Secondly, we are also able to isolate the factors that are responsible for mitigating civil conflict. Finally, we highlight the process of peace-making as a Pareto-improving investment in allocating resources in the context of core-periphery interrelationships.
See: https://www.worldscientific.com/toc/ijdc/02/02
6. War and Peace: A Liberalist Reassessment
Nguyen Manh Hung
https://doi.org/10.1142/S2010269012500111
Abstract
In a simple formal model of two-country, two-good with an elementary Conflict Technology, we use rudimentary game theoretics to study the matter of war and peace where under peace, cooperative exchange takes place and where, in case of war, the winner takes all through appropriation of the whole endowment left after payment of armament expenditures. We provide conditions under which war is inevitable then go on to characterize situations where war, still probable, is not necessarily the final outcome. In this case, cooperative exchange is profitable for both countries, and they should take this welfare gain from trade into account in the determination of their armament expenditures. This problem will be cast in terms of a two-stage game, the final stage is modelled as a Nash Bargaining solution with endogenous threat-point, and the precedent stage, aimed at the determination of armament expenditure, is modelled as a Nash Bayesian Equilibrum in the context of incomplete information. With a simple rule of Bayesian inferences, it is possible to transform the game under incomplete information into one under imperfect information and solve for pure strategies. Using backward induction to yield the perfect equilibrium of this two-stage game, this paper provides a simple solution which concurs with the liberalist view, that economic gain in trade would enhance not war but peace between nations.